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Abstract. This paper examines the existing literature on trade liberalisation and itseffect on 
the economies of developing countries. It will also briefly examine the theory of 
comparative advantage which is seen as justification for global trade liberalisation under 
the auspices of the World Trade Organisation. This process is also associated with greater 
openness, economic interdependence and deepening economic integration with the world 
economy. The study is important because once again the international institutions strongly 
advocate trade and financial liberalisation in developing countries. The proponents of trade 
liberalisation argue that multilateral trade negotiations would achieve these goals, and poor 
countries particularly would benefit from it. However, such policies may increase 
vulnerability and make developing countries further hostages of international finance 
capital. Adoption of open market policies in agriculture would also mean the abandoning of 
self-reliance and food sovereignty, which may have wider consequences in terms of food 
shortages, food prices and rural employment. 
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1. Introduction 
he World Trade Organisation (WTO) is widely seen as promoting prosperity 
through trade, especially favouring developing countries. This is presented 
so as to achieve „fair trade‟ and economic growth in developing countries 
(WTO, 2013).A new round of global trade negotiations, the Doha Round, has taken 
place under the WTO. It is said that increased trade and interdependent goods and 
services and money markets underscore the importance of international 
cooperation to contain crises and promote growth. The proponents of trade 
liberalisation argue that multilateral trade negotiations would achieve these goals, 
and poor countries particularly would benefit from it; while critiques say that trade 
rules under the WTO and international financial institutions will acquire more 
power, which could restrict the ability of developing countries to pursue an 
independent economic policy. 
Globalisation is described as a process of integration into the world economy. It 
consists of three key areas, namely trade, investment and finance. This process is 
also associated with greater openness, economic interdependence and deepening 
economic integration with the world economy. The aim of this paper is to study the 
issue of „free trade‟ in the light of past experiences and whether we can draw some 
lesson from it.   
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This paper aims to examine free trade in a historical perspective in order to 
understand its implications and future prospects for development. The focus of the 
study also briefly discusses previous attempts by military force to open up 
economies in the name of „free trade‟ in the colonies by the European powers 
during the late 19
th
 century. Britain adopted „free trade‟ policies in the 19th century 
when it had relatively more advanced technologies and industries compared to 
other European countries. Such policies were extended to the colonies to further its 
business and trade interests. Since mid-19
th
 century Africa and Latin American 
countries were integrated into the world economy as the supplier of primary 
commodity, as envisaged by the „comparative advantage‟ model. However, after 
the Second World War these countries opted in favour of industrialisation, with 
different degrees of political commitment and state involvement via „import 
substitution industrialisation‟ policies. Despite a number of constraints, their 
growth rate performance was in fact better than it had been during the period of 
market liberalisation. However, such policies came to a dead end due to debt crisis 
and in the changing international environment (Ghose, 2004; Siddiqui, 2012).  
Under such circumstances (i.e. both domestic and international), there was 
strong pressure on developing countries to accept trade and financial liberalisation 
by the IMF, World Bank. But the difficulties of the Doha Round negotiations under 
the WTO were due, it seems, not only to lack of reaching a consensus on 
agriculture, but also to loss of national policy manoeuvres felt by the developing 
countries. The governments displayed an inability to deploy effective policies in 
situations where their assistance might be needed to spur economic development or 
fight high levels of underemployment. Their domestic policy space and flexibility 
was being constrained by the proposals under the WTO negotiations based on 
comparative advantage, which has major weaknesses on both theoretical and 
empirical grounds. On theoretical grounds, its weakness stems from not addressing 
externalities such as market failures, environmental costs and investment in 
education. As Gallagher (2008: 63) argues, “When markets stray from ideal 
conditions, market „failures‟ emerge that distort the real functioning of the 
economy against the ideal result, creating or sustaining inequalities, environmental 
stress, and technological stagnation or regress… when the market fails, policy 
instruments should be deployed to correct the distortions created by private 
markets”.  
On empirical grounds we have examples of successful economic development 
in East Asian economies such as Malaysia, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, 
and more recently in China (Siddiqui, 2016; Gallagher, 2008). The success of their 
higher growth rates shows a clear role for governments in smoothing out the 
difficulties. These countries have successfully taken independent policy measures 
to spur economic development, which has proved very critical in the early years of 
their path to industrialisation. A number of studies have pointed out that the 
governments in East Asian countries have invested in major outlays on 
infrastructure, education and skills development, import licensing, quotas, 
exchange rate controls and wage restraints (Siddiqui, 2012; Rodrik, 2004). 
Enactment of all such policies by the states has resulted in the successful 
development of the manufacturing sector, with government subsidised credits from 
state banks being extended to manufacturing in exchange for concrete results. 
It can be argued that all subsidies would encourage „rent seeking‟ behaviour that 
would make it difficult for the developing countries to pick winners (Krueger, 
1996). Government bureaucracy needs to maintain neutrality and should be above 
from sectional interests of seeking rents. As Amsden finds, public institutions in 
countries such South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore disciplined the economic 
behaviour of companies based on their information and performance assessment. 
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“Reciprocity disciplined subsidy recipients and thereby minimized government 
failures. Subsidies were allocated to make manufacturing profitable – to convert 
moneylenders into financiers and importers into industrialists – but did not become 
giveaways. Recipients of subsidies were subjected to monitor able performance 
standards that were redistributive in nature and result oriented. The reciprocal 
control mechanism thus transformed the inefficiency and venality associated with 
government intervention into collective goods” (Amsden, 2005:222). 
Various studies have shown that state intervention in the national economy has 
proved to be a crucial policy element in achieving successful economic 
development (Amsden, 2005; Gallagher, 2005). There seems to be a need for state 
management to make the market friendlier towards national economic 
developmental needs. Many developmental policies that are now criticised by 
developed countries are the very same policies that were once essential in the early 
years of their industrialisation process. As Rodrik emphasises:“Almost all 
successful cases of development in the last fifty years have been based on creative 
and often heterodox policy innovations… At the time, GATT rules were sparse and 
permissive, so nations combined their trade policy with unorthodox policies: high 
levels of tariff and non-tariff barriers, public ownership of large segments of 
banking and industry and export subsidies, domestic content requirements, import-
export linkages, patent and copyright infringements, directed credit and restrictions 
on capital flows… In all of these countries, trade liberalisation was a gradual 
process, drawn out over a period of decades rather than years” (Rodrik, 2004, cited 
in Gallagher, 2005:8).  
 
2. History of Free Trade 
The period from 1870 to 1914 was the period known as the age of laissez-faire 
and government intervention was minimal. This period saw a rapid increase in 
trade and it was estimated that during this period growth in world trade was 3.9% 
annually, which was much faster than growth in world output at an average 2.5% 
per annum (Nayyar, 2006). The share of world trade in world output rose steadily 
during this period. On average the developed countries share of exports in GDP 
rose from 18.2% in 1900 to 21.2% in 1913 (World Bank, 2014; Maddison, 2006). 
Trade barriers began to come down in Europe with the Anglo-French treaty on 
trade, seen as a first step towards this direction. However, lowering the barriers to 
trade was then confined to Europe, while the US practised protection during the 
period 1870 to 1914, where average tariff levels were around 40-50% on 
manufactured goods (Chang, 2002). 
In Europe, Britain and the Netherlands continued to practice free trade. 
Moreover, once European countries colonised the rest of the world, especially Asia 
and Africa, they imposed free trade on their colonies. In 1842 China was forced by 
Britain to sign a treaty that led to the opening of the Chinese market to European 
products, with an import tariff as low as just 5%; and also in the 1840s free trade 
was imposed on India by Britain. The Netherlands removed tariff barriers on 
Indonesia. In 1858, Japan was also forced to accept free trade under US navy 
threats. The Commodore Perry and Shimoda-Harris treaty was signed with the aim 
of opening up Japanese markets for US products (Chang, 2002). 
Morocco in 1856 was forced to accept a maximum import duty of 10% by 
Britain. The Anglo-Turkish commercial convention of 1838 led to the imposition 
of very low tariffs of only 3% on Ottoman territories. As a result, British merchants 
were granted free access to trade in all parts of the Ottoman Empire without paying 
any internal duties (Maddison, 2006).Torrens argues in 1820 that “England‟s 
growth rate could be augmented through the further unleashing of productive 
Turkish Economic Review 
 TER, 3(1), K. Siddiqui, p.103-121. 
106 
106 
forces in manufactures and the by passing of the natural impediments in the 
primary producing sector, her trading partners would be trailing behind in terms of 
their rate of accumulation. Upon perceiving this development … more aggressively 
opening markets for English products as well as tapping new or expanded sources 
of supply to satisfy her needs for raw products” (cited in Ho, 1996:28). 
Portugal took the lead in opening trade with Asia by the end of the 17
th
 century. 
Its trading activities were established by a strong navy and with the help of armed 
ships to control shipping routes and also to intimidate the local producers in coastal 
areas. Portuguese traders set up bases around deep harbours in Mozambique, 
Hormuz in the Persian Gulf, Goa in India, Jaffna in Ceylon, Macau, and Timor in 
Indonesia. In the beginning, the Portuguese trade in Asia consisted of pepper and 
spices and their merchants paid in bullions for their purchases as Asian countries 
had no interest in European products (Gallagher & Robinson, 1953). The 
Portuguese soon began to charge fees on Asian ships using their harbours. Such 
claims remained unchallenged as the Chinese and Japanese slowly withdrew from 
their participation in international trade. The Portuguese occupied the western 
coastal part of India, where they hardly faced any challenge; then the Mughal 
Empire in Delhi and Vijayenagar rulers in South India, where they merely derived 
their income from land taxes and had no significant financial interest in foreign 
trade.  
However, by the 1650s the Dutch defeated the Portuguese and captured most of 
their ports in Asia, leading to the Dutch company (VOC) accounting for 45% of the 
European voyagers in Asia from 1640 to 1800 and being given a monopoly charter. 
Their ships were armed and the Company had the power to wage war, and establish 
treaties with Asian rulers. Over the period between 1640 and 1800, the VOC sent 
nearly one million sailors, soldiers and admin staff to its 30 Asian trading ports 
(Habib, 1995);certainly, buying cheap to sell dear by the monopoly chartered 
companies engaging in long distance trade, where these companies made huge 
monopoly profits (Bagchi, 2010). The British took over Bengal in 1757, which 
greatly weakened the Portuguese position in Asia. Until the first quarter of the 19th 
century, the impact of European colonisation in Asia was modest. In Asia the level 
of technology was much more sophisticated and the major Asian countries such as 
the Ottoman territories, Safavid in Iran, the Mughal in India, and China and Japan 
were far better equipped to resist occupation than the Aztecs and Incas and North 
American indigenous tribes (Bagchi, 2010).  
However, in China the British military attack and political hold failed to break 
down Chinese economic self-sufficiency. The opium wars of the 1840s and again 
in the 1850s and the burning of the summer palace in 1860 widened British trade, 
but they did not succeed in making the Chinese dependent on British products. 
Despite forcible opening of the Chinese markets by the British and French and 
bringing the country into semi-colonial relations in the mid-19
th
 century, lasting 
until the mid-20
th
 century, the European attempt to break the country‟s self-
sufficiency and sell European products into Chinese markets largely failed. China 
remained self-sufficient and did not become a large market for European products 
in the 19
th
 century.  
British officials in Egypt had relied on Gladstonian policies that assumed that 
the free market is critical to expand its interests. To achieve this balanced budget, 
government spending and taxation should be kept low. Egypt was initially 
occupied by Napoleon, but its market was fully opened by Britain; thus Egypt was 
forced to accept a „free trade‟ treaty in the 1841 Khedive‟s attempt to modernise its 
economy, through borrowing and also by encouraging European immigration and 
businesses to invest in Egypt (Owen, 2004). The Egyptian government invested 
heavily especially in the sugar and cotton industries; these finished products were 
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mainly aimed for foreign markets. As a result, the production of sugar and cotton 
increased rapidly in the 1850s and 1860s. However, due to a slump in export 
demands and mismanagement in the 1870s, these industries witnessed a deep crisis 
and exports fell sharply. With the dwindling export markets, Egypt began to 
increasingly rely on foreign borrowing, especially from Europe. Egypt‟s foreign 
debts increased along with corruption and nepotism. Between 1862 and 1880, 
Egypt‟s long-term debt rose from UK£ 3 million to UK£ 68 million (Owen, 2004).  
As Gallagher & Robinson (1953) found: “Foreign loans and predatory bankers 
by the 1870‟shad wrecked Egyptian finances and were tearing holes in the 
Egyptian political fabric. The Anglo-French dual financial control to safeguard the 
foreign bondholders and to restore Egypt as a good risk provoked anti-European 
feeling. With the revolt of Arabi Pasha in 1881, the Khedive‟s government could 
serve no longer to secure either the all-important Canal or the foreign investors‟ 
pound of flesh” (Gallagher & Robinson, 1953: 13-14). 
The British then focused on negotiating a financial settlement to the law of 
liquidation of the 1880s that would ensure debt repayment through rigorous 
budgetary control and also guarantee discipline of long-term financial control and 
stability. In 1882 Brailsford notes (1998:101): “Egypt was already a nation 
emerging from the lethargy and oppression of centuries when it was invaded by 
Britain at the behest of the owners of its usurious debt.” Prior to the occupation in 
1882, Lord Cromer was already working as a British Agent-General and the 
effective ruler of Egypt. Lord Cromer kept expenditure on education miserably 
low, which soon became the main reason for the stranglehold on any attempt to 
modernise the economy (Brailsford 1998; Chang, 2008). 
Britain‟s trade with India until the mid-18th century consisted mainly of imports 
of textiles, silk and spices. India remained the largest exporter of cotton textiles in 
the world until the end of the 18
th
 century. Since Britain had nothing to offer India, 
Britain had to pay in gold and silver for its imports. The huge amount of gold and 
silver looted from Latin America was used as payment for its imports (Bagchi, 
2010; Siddiqui, 1990). 
With victory in the battle at Plassey in 1757 Britain began to occupy more 
territories and with this it raised land revenue in India to meet its war expenses and 
also to pay for her imports from India. Britain‟s total imports from India were paid 
for by Indian revenue and thus constituted a “drain”, or the “tribute” paid by India 
to Britain as a cost of being colonised. This tribute was very critical to Britain‟s 
economic developmental process. Irfan Habib (1995) calculated that in 1801, 
during the period of Britain‟s industrial development, the “tribute” to Britain from 
India represented about 9% of the entire GNP of the British occupied territories in 
India which was equal to nearly 30% of the British domestic savings available for 
capital formation in Britain.  
India‟s trade consisted of two parts, its trade with Britain and its trade with the 
rest of the world. India had an export surplus on its merchandise account with the 
rest of the world, but always had a trade deficit with Britain mainly because of 
British manufacturing charging higher prices. They also found vast markets in 
India by compulsorily opening up India‟s markets (Siddiqui, 1990). However, 
India‟s surplus with the rest of the world far exceeded the trade deficit with Britain, 
leaving an overall merchandise export surplus for India, which rose over time. To 
appropriate India‟s global foreign exchange earnings and surplus, all Britain did 
was to administratively impose tribute charges to be paid in pounds sterling; such 
practice was not seen for any sovereign nation (Bagchi, 2010). 
Once the industries in Britain began to expand and industrialisation took 
firmerroots, its interest in the colonies changed. Rather than simply buying and 
selling, investment in mining and production of raw materials for British industries 
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became more crucial tasks and later on demanded greater access to markets in the 
colonies. As a result, in India for example, the absolute decline of the 
manufacturing sector took place, which is known as de-industrialisation. The 
reallocation of labour and the urban population from manufacturing activities to 
primary production led to overcrowding of the agriculture sector (Habib, 1995; 
Siddiqui, 1990). For example, India was prevented from developing their long-term 
comparative advantage in manufacturing, as local manufactures and handicrafts 
had no social or political influence or connections with the colonial governments, 
meaning their interests were ignored against the pressures and interests of the 
foreign manufacturers. The colonial government during the Great Depression of 
the 1930s in India consistently pursued deflationary policies despite falling output 
and exports. In the colonies there was no political or organised opposition against 
policies to transform the colonies into specialises in supplying raw materials in the 
name of David Ricardo‟s theory of comparative advantage (Siddiqui, 2015a); while 
at the same time the developed countries, in order to continue their control over the 
colonies, necessitated the monopolisation of high technologies and offensive 
military technologies, thus also creating disunity among the colonies (Brown, 
1993).  
Even at the end of the 18
th
 century India‟s share of the world‟s manufacturing 
output was as high as 19.7%, but had fallen to 8.6% by 1860. As Gallagher & 
Robinson (1953) note, “In India it was possible, throughout most of the period of 
the British Raj, to use the governing power to extort in the form of taxes and 
monopolies such valuable primary products as opium and salt. Furthermore, the 
characteristics of so-called imperialist expansion at the end of 19
th
 century 
developed in India long before the date 1880… Direct governmental promotion of 
products required by British industry, government manipulation of tariffs to help 
British exports, railway construction at high and guaranteed rates of interest to 
open the continental interior – all these techniques of direct political control were 
employed in ways which seem alien to the so-called age of laissez faire” 
(Gallagher & Robinson, 1953:4).Despite the adoption of free trade policy during 
the colonial period, the growth rate of per capita income in India was almost 
stagnant between 1820 and 1913, while independent countries such as Europe, the 
US and Japan witnessed a rapid increase in growth rates and successfully built their 
industrial sector. 
 
Table 1. Share of the World’s GDP (%of world total) 
Year 1500 1700 1820 1870 1913 1950 1973 2001 
Britain 1.1 2.9 5.2 9.0 8.2 6.5 4.2 3.2 
Western Europe 17.8 21.9 23.0 33.0 33.0 26.2 25.6 20.3 
US 0.3 0.1 1.8 8.8 18.9 27.3 22.1 21.4 
China 24.9 22.3 32.9 17.1 8.8 4.5 4.6 12.3 
India 24.4 24.4 16.0 12.1 7.5 4.2 3.1 5.4 
Asia (excluding Japan)  61.9 57.7 56.4 36.1 22.3 15.4 16.4 30.9 
Source: Angus Maddison (2006) The World Economy, Vol.1, Paris: OECD, Table 8b  
 
Angus Maddison (2006) estimated the world‟s gross domestic product between 
1500 and 2001. As Table 1 indicates, after colonisation, the West Europe share 
began to rise, while Asia‟s share began to fall. The process rose sharply as large 
parts of Asia were colonised and by 1913 the Asian global GDP share was merely 
two-thirds that of West Europe. Together China and India produced nearly half of 
the world‟s total GDP share in the 18th century. At the beginning of the 19th century 
India was the largest economy in the world with nearly one quarter of the world‟s 
output, which was then greater than that of the entire Western Europe region and 
more than eight times that of Britain. However, at the end of the two centuries of 
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colonial rule, India‟s share had fallen to a mere 4.2% and even less than two-thirds 
of Britain‟s GDP in the 1950s (Maddison, 2006). 
 
3. Free Trade, Openness and Industrialisation  
In the mid-19
th
 century, the UK became the promoter of free trade policies, 
which were then not suitable for Germany or the US. Friedrich List demonstrated 
this by likening Britain‟s promotion of free trade to „kicking away the ladder‟ by 
which it had risen to deprive others of the means of climbing up (Chang, 2008). As 
Friedrich List commented: “It is a very clever common device that when anyone 
has attained the summit of greatness, he kicks away the ladder by which he has 
climbed up, in order to deprive others of the means of climbing up after him … 
Any nation which by means of protective duties and restrictions on navigation to 
such a degree of development that no other nation can sustain free competition 
with her, can do nothing wiser than to throw away this ladder of her greatness, to 
preach other nations the benefits of free trade …” (List, 1966: 368) 
On the question of laying the foundations of industry in a country that is behind 
and needs to catch up in the industrialisation process, the country must take steps in 
clear policy measures to protect and build industries. As List suggests, to cat chup 
with a country such as Germany, first it has to lay grounds for industrial 
development. “In order to allow freedom of trade to operate naturally, the less 
advanced nation must first be raised by artificial measures to that stage of 
cultivation to which the English nation has been artificially elevated” (List, 1966: 
131). 
The industrial revolution in Britain had shown other countries the path to 
industrialisation and how to learn from its experience and move forward. But 
copying and industrialisation could lead to increased competition to procure inputs 
and markets for their finished products. However, the first countries to follow 
Britain were independent nations who had full control over their resources and 
economic policies. For example, in the United States, British businesses turned 
cotton production to their advantage and wanted to repeat this in the mid-west 
region of the US as well. But the political leadership of the US then stood firmly 
against it, which resulted in the industrial lobby successfully campaigning to raise 
tariffs, despite the strong opposition from those sections that relied on and profited 
from the British connections (Chang, 2008). 
The interests of manufacturing capital in the developed countries prioritised 
securing access to markets and lower prices for their imported raw materials, while 
their businesses had an interest in keeping higher prices for their manufactured 
goods. Often in their colonies European businesses had a better chance of earning 
monopoly profits. Pursuing the trade objectives dominated by their manufacturing 
and financial interests required the creating of conditions whereby the economies 
of the colonial countries were transformed to complement the industrial interests of 
the European countries; while at the same time manufacturing or any sort of 
potential competition must disappear to make way for the greater demands of the 
manufactured goods from the colonial powers.  
Figure 1 shows that the US economy was far less open prior to the two World 
Wars and the Great Depression and we find that in the post-war period its economy 
has opened remarkably. Following the Second World War, the US and other 
developed countries negotiated under the Uruguay Round to reduce trade barriers 
which contributed to rising world trade (Wade, 2003; World Bank, 2014). 
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Figure 1. Openness of the US Economy from the period of 1890 to 2013. 
Source. US Census Bureau, US Trade in Goods and Services, at http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/ 
 
Recent multilateral trade deals have, besides liberalising trade in goods and 
services, at the same time strengthened monopolies in the pre-production phase 
through control over knowledge in the form of intellectual property rights such as 
patents and industrial design and in the post-production phase, as well by increased 
enforcement of branding and marketing. As a result, the value added of such trade 
seems to be concentrated in the developed countries while the developing countries 
compete over the spoils of the low-value segments.  
The WTO was established in 1995, taking over from GATT (General 
Agreement of Trade and Tariffs). Trade liberalisation negotiations have taken place 
since 1947 in a series of lengthy „Rounds‟ negotiations. These rounds of talks were 
meant to enable countries to reach agreement over access to each other‟s markets 
and also trade relationships between developed and developing countries. They 
also accepted that „special differential treatment‟ would apply in which developing 
countries were supposed to have preferential access to markets in the developed 
countries, as well as some sort of providing time to build industries in their own 
countries. However, with the establishment of the WTO, earlier proposed policies 
were altered and special and differential treatment was redefined with merely 
allowing developing countries longer adjustment periods in which to implement 
neoliberal policies and make the adjustment period shorter (Sen, 2005; Curtis, 
2006). 
The WTO is being presented as the only “development” model available for 
developing countries. It is also aimed at the enlargement of the markets for global 
monopolies in the areas of manufacturing, agriculture and services through the 
Uruguay Rounds of negotiations where it is being referred to as expansion of trade 
for the development and well-being of everyone, i.e. a win–win game for all 
participants. “Building supply-side capacity” is the key towards higher exports and 
ultimately higher incomes and employment for the developing countries. However, 
such policies ignore the economic and political space for self-determination and 
development based on local realities and needs. Here it appears that the focus is 
largely on GDP growth based on Western models (Siddiqui, 2015c).  
In the WTO meeting in Hong Kong, and later on in Bali, the developing 
countries were offered a so-called developmental package that would enable them 
to build supply side capacity including infrastructure to promote trade related 
activities. The emphasis was also on promoting the cultivation of cash crops in 
developing countries for export. Of the three major areas of agreement under the 
WTO negotiations – TRIPS on property rights, TRIMS on investment measures, 
and GATS on services –TRIPS covers protection of trademarks, patents, 
copyrights, industrial design etc. At present, as far as the question of knowledge 
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and technology, the developed countries are net producers and the developing 
countries are net consumers. TRIPS will increase the price of patentable knowledge 
to consumers and as a consequence, the flow of rents from the developing countries 
to developed countries will increase. These changes in policy measures will limit 
the authority of the developing countries to have any say in the choices of 
companies operating in their countries. It appears that with the current agenda of 
universal trade liberalisation, not only will development space shrink but self-
determination and economic sovereignty will also be undermined (Siddiqui, 2012).  
For example, more than half of the world‟s service exports are accounted for by 
West European countries, while on the other hand, for the largest exporter of 
services, i.e. China, services accounts for less than 3% of its total trade. As Table 2 
shows, services, including patent fillings are very important for developed 
countries. 
 
Table 2. Patent Fillings by Selected Countries in 2013 
Country Number of Patent Fillings 
US 51,625 
Japan 43,660 
Germany 18,617 
France 7,851 
Switzerland 4,190 
Netherlands 4,071 
South Korea 11,848 
China 18,617 
Source: World Intellectual Property Organisation, The International Patent System: Monthly 
Statistics Report, 2013 at www.wipo.int/ipstas/en. 
 
GATS (The General Agreement on Trade in Services), TRIPS and TRIMS are 
committed to promoting neoliberal policies. GATS is also designed to further open 
up markets for services with penalty clauses and sections against governments 
found breaching GATS regulations. For GATS, the central point of the agreement 
is to achieve market liberalisation in services. However, trade liberalisation also 
includes finance, insurance, transport, education and health. It is also said that de-
regulation in financial markets and implementation would most likely increase 
speculation-led activities dominated by the financial sector and short-term rather 
than long-term investment. Foreign direct investment (FDI) from developed 
countries iscurrently more than five times that originating from developing 
countries. FDI inflows into developing countries encourage Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A) which will further add to the concentration of economic and 
market powers and towards building of monopolies and oligopolies rather than 
competitive markets, as envisaged by the neo-classical theorists (Siddiqui, 2015c). 
Earlier, the treaties under the GATT negotiations recognised Special and 
Differential Treatment for developing countries. However, later on in 1994 the 
Uruguay Round treaty changed this to a single-tier system of rights and 
obligations, meaning that developing countries have to implement in full all the 
rules, seen as quid pro quo, for market access in the textile and agriculture sectors, 
which are highly protected in developed countries. Any autonomous developments 
will eventually require wider policy choice, which is being limited to developing 
countries (Stiglitz, 2005). TRIMS does not permit practices such as local product 
linkages between foreign and local investors or foreign exchange earning 
requirements. TRIPS will further encourage privatisation and monopoly ownership 
of knowledge and will severely limit and reverse the initiatives achieved by the 
public sector in manufacturing and medicine in developing countries.  
As a consequence of the implementation of WTO backed trade and services, 
liberalisation would certainly mean that the developmental option and economic 
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diversification would be shrinking for most developing countries. Even the policies 
of the recent past to upgrade technologies and structural changes with state active 
assistance will no longer be available to most developing countries. The options of 
sovereign decision making and promoting a policy suitable to their specific 
conditions will be seen as a hostile move by the WTO and international financial 
institutions. Their key priority is „opening-up markets‟ and for that they have key 
international agreements – TRIPS, TRIMS and GATS (Wade, 2003). 
 
 
Figure 2. Share of Developing Countries in World Exports of Manufactured Goods 
Sources: UNCTAD Statistical Handbook, http://unctadstat.unctad.org. 
 
 
Figure 3. Share of Developing countries in Manufactured Goods Imports of Developed 
Nations 
Sources. UNCTAD Statistical Handbook, http://unctadstat.unctad.org. 
 
Figures 2 and 3 show that the share of developing countries in the world‟s 
export of manufacturing has steadily increased since 1955 and also that these 
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countries have been importing high tech and manufactured goods from the 
developed countries. However, East Asian countries have done considerably better 
than other developing countries. In this region, a mixture of both state and market 
were used to promote economic development and industrialisation. A recent 
example of Chinese government intervention to facilitate and promote businesses 
and exports could not be ignored. Public investment in infrastructures and 
education sectors played a key role in attracting inflows of foreign capital. 
Moreover, China controlled inflows of foreign capital and the government 
managed large parts of trade and owned heavy manufacturing industries. On the 
other hand, most sub-Saharan African countries are largely dependent on primary 
commodities exports. For instance, for the 18 African countries, exports of primary 
commodities consisted of 70% of their export earnings in 2000 (Stiglitz, 2005).   
 
4. State and Trade Policies 
Past experience has showed that the state played an important role in economic 
development and developmental state policies were necessary in order to 
successfully accomplish industrialisation in developing countries.  
Early development of industries benefitted from proactive state measures and 
protective support. Ha-Joon Chang identifies at least four distinct phases of British 
trade policies, where the state played a crucial role. Henry VII and his successors 
started laying clear policy measures in the 16
th
 century in support of building and 
protecting the development of domestic industries, the modern version of which is 
infant industries promotion. Later on in 1721, the British Prime Minister further 
undertook protectionist and regulatory measures to promote industries, especially 
the woollen industry. Such policies were promoted throughout the industrial 
revolution period in the late 18
th
 and early 19
th
 century until Britain attained a 
technological lead and industrial supremacy; and finally, the Corn Laws were 
repealed and free trade was promoted. It was intended to halt the move to 
industrialisation of other European countries (Chang, 2008; Brown, 1993). 
As Engels argued, Britain, in order to achieve industrial supremacy, adopted a 
policy combination of mercantilism and imperialism. He wrote comments for a 
preface to Marx‟s speech on free trade. “It was under the fostering wing of 
protection that the system of modern industry… was hatched and developed in 
England during the last third of the 18
th
 century. And, as if tariff protection was not 
sufficient, the wars against French Revolution helped to secure England the 
monopoly of the new industrial methods. For more than 20 years, English men of 
war [fighting ships] cut off the industrial rivals of England from their respective 
colonial markets, while they forcibly opened their markets for English 
commerce… the progressive subjugation of India turned the people of all these 
immense territories into customers of English goods” (Engels, 1990:522). 
Moreover, Britain and other European countries in the past exported their large 
number of unemployed and social discontent section of the population overseas. 
This was made possible by the invasion and seizure of vast territories from 
indigenous inhabitants in the Americas, South Africa and Australia. Certainly, such 
a massive land grabs and looting of resources and outmigration did provide huge 
assistance in facilitating the process of industrialisation in European countries, 
especially Britain. For example, between 1812 and 1914 about 20 million people 
migrated from Britain and nearly two-thirds went outside the Empire. Furthermore, 
from 1870 to 1914, migration particularly to new territories was enormous and 
more than 50 million people migrated from Europe to Canada, the US, South 
America, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand. This huge emigration from 
Europe amounted to one-eighth of the European population during that period. 
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Moreover, outmigration countries such as Britain, Italy, Portugal and Spain 
amounted to between 20 and 40% of their total population (Stalker, 1994). Without 
taking all aspects into account, especially the occupation of new territories and the 
outmigration from Europe, would mean not looking at the entire matter in totality. 
In contrast to West European countries, Japan in the East Asian colonies 
invested heavily in infrastructure, education and modern technologies, which 
played a crucial role in raising productivity and economic diversification. This 
reversal in colonial policies in the past had quite different outcomes. For example, 
during the colonial period Taiwan‟s agriculture became highly efficient and 
productive. Japan was also in a hurry to set up heavy industries in its colonies. It 
was envisaged that in the case of war such policies would prove to be beneficial 
and strategically important. Since importing labour was almost a closed option, this 
meant transferring Japanese industries to the colonies such as Taiwan and Korea 
with the availability of cheap raw materials and labour costs (Amsden, 2005).  
Globalisation in the 19
th
 century coincided with the rapid changes in 
technology, particularly in transportation costs and time, both of which were 
reduced drastically. This period also witnessed the invention of steamships, the 
telegraph and railways and all these led to further reduction in the costs of freight 
by two-thirds and, furthermore, the opening up of the Suez canal in 1869 halved 
the distance from Bombay to London. These technological developments had even 
more dramatic impact on reducing geographical barriers in 1914; the long-term 
FDI in the world economy was distributed in an uneven manner, e.g. more than 
half of FDI (i.e. 55%) went to developed countries, i.e. 30% to Europe and 25% 
toUS, while 45% went to poor countries and to European colonies, i.e. 20% to 
Latin America and 20% to Asia and Africa. In 1913, the primary sector accounted 
for 55% of long-term total global foreign investment, while investment in transport 
etc. accounted for another 30% and the manufacturing sector only 10%, which was 
mainly concentrated in Europe and the US (Bagchi, 2010). 
 
5. Comparative Advantage 
The theory of comparative advantage is provided as support for worldwide trade 
liberalisation. The theory claims that free trade is beneficial for all countries. It is 
further said that free trade will automatically lead to the realisation of various other 
benefits. For example, once the poor countries open up their markets and join free 
trade, living conditions will improve. The WTO argues that economic welfare can 
be maximised through free trade. However, comparative theory rests on 
assumptions that there are no trade imbalances between countries (WTO, 2013; 
Bhagwati, & Krueger, 2001). 
The theoretical support for free trade rests on David Ricardo‟s theory of 
comparative advantage. In his 19
th
 century proposition, he argued England and 
Portugal could engage in mutually beneficial exchange of cloth and wine, 
regardless of respective productivities and prices. However, in the 20
th
 century 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (H-O-S), while primarily basing his view on 
Ricardo‟s theory, said that countries must export products based on inputs they 
have in abundance and import products based on inputs that are scarce. However, 
the trade pattern does not confirm such a claim, as most trade occurs among 
countries that possess similar endowments. To explain this, Paul Krugman (1987) 
put forward a new trade theory that justified policy intervention such as tariffs and 
subsidies. In fact, the difference between the economies of developed and 
developing countries does have an impact on trade.  
For instance, suppose the developing countries specialise in sectors for which 
they have abundant supply, as recommended by the H-O-S module. This would 
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mean developing countries would focus on primary products that have little added 
value. Moreover, prices of primary products tend to decrease compared to 
manufactured products; and manufacturing plays a very important role not only in 
expanding areas for employment, and also in raising overall productivity in the 
economy, including the agriculture sector. Earlier, the World Bank study predicted 
welfare gains in 2015 of US$ 96 billion (one-fifth of 1% of the world‟s GDP). 
Developed countries stand to gain US$ 80 billion (82%), compared with $16 
billion (18%) for the developing countries. However, a major proportion of the 
developing countries‟ share would go to countries such as China, India and Brazil, 
$1 billion each, whereas African countries would be net losers of $3 billion 
(Anderson & Martin, 2005). While Polaski (2006) found that global gains from 
further trade liberalisation would be 0.2% of the world‟s GDP, even if the Western 
market were more opened, most gains would go to China, India and Brazil. 
Paul Krugman argues that trade patterns could be explained by increasing the 
returns to scale and imperfect competition. On trade theories he complains that 
“Since mainstream trade theory derived its power and unity from being stated in 
formal general equilibrium terms, alternative views were relegated to the footnotes” 
(Krugman, 1987:133).Trade theory places much emphasis on relative prices and 
costs in explaining international trade. However, recent experiences of the 
developing countries show that this is not the case. In fact, a number of studies 
have shown that price levels have accounted for very little in explaining 
international trade. And as such Ricardo‟s comparative advantage theory seems to 
be inadequate due to a number of assumptions such as perfect competition, full 
employment, homogeneous goods and empirical irrelevance (Barker, 1977). 
According to neo-classical theory, productivity growth in one country leads to 
an appreciation of its currency. trade leads to, “the happy result that all countries 
will be able successfully to participate in international trade in the sense that they 
will benefit from such trade and be able to generate export revenues equal to the 
value of imports” (Milberg, 2004: 56-57).The country‟s higher productivity is 
balanced by disadvantageous movements of the exchange rate. Further, its factor 
price equalisation model even postulates that the difference in real wages would be 
reduced and ultimately eliminated. The neo-classical theorists argue that countries 
would conform to the wage level of rich countries and free trade policies are seen 
as a great equaliser among countries. It is argued that free trade has alone, “the 
potential for development and convergence between rich and poor countries” 
(Kiely, 2007: 15). Contrary to such claims, Kaldor suggests such effect “is nothing 
else than the inhibiting effect of superior competitive power of industrially more 
efficient and dynamic countries, as compared to others” (Kaldor, 1981: 597). 
According to him, some countries benefit more from free trade while others benefit 
less or might even suffer losses depending on their level of development. Kaldor 
observes that, “under more realistic assumptions unrestricted trade is likely to lead 
to a loss of welfare to particular regions or countries” (Kaldor, 1981: 593). 
Empirical studies also do not support the expected associations between trade 
liberalisation and increase in income levels. Rodrik (2001) finds, “that there is no 
convincing evidence that trade liberalisation is predictably associated with 
subsequent economic growth” (Rodrik, 2001: 11). It is also true that countries that 
export mainly agricultural and primary commodities have witnessed declining 
terms of trade and have also seen an uninterrupted sharp rise in their trade deficits. 
The imbalances are not only far from balanced out as the theory suggested but 
rather have led to further accumulation of debts and debt crises.  
The neo-classical assumptions could be rejected on theoretical, logical and 
empirical grounds. Therefore, comparative trade theory cannot determine 
international trade patterns (Maneschi, 1992). The issue of a possible causal link 
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between trade liberalisation and reduction in income inequality is unclear. Neo-
classical theorists predict that the growth of world trade would lead to a reduction 
in income disparities across countries. However, these claims are based on a 
number of assumptions whose validity is being questioned by various empirical 
researches and are also far from the past experiences of the developed countries.  
It is widely recognised, for example, the gap in average per capita between the 
richest and the poorest countries has increased substantially in recent decades 
(Ghose, 2004). Since the adoption of neoliberal economic policies in the 1980s and 
with the abandonment of Keynesianism, meant to limit government fiscal policy 
measures to stimulate the economy, there has been a rapid increase in income and 
wealth inequalities in most developing countries (Cornia, 1999). 
The neo-classical theory assumes the persistence of full employment and 
therefore, a rise in trade that can affect growth only through factor allocation and 
increasing the levels of competition and technology in the economy. As a result, 
not only will economic growth increase but also efficiency and productivity as 
well. It is further assumed that if the developing countries relax on foreign capital 
inflow regulation then inflows of capital will increase into the developing countries 
(Krueger, 1996). 
At present, trade policies suggested by neo-classical economists for developing 
countries have exclusively focused on the Pareto-Optimality conditions in multiple 
markets which are achievable under free trade. It is further said that any deviations 
from competitive equilibrium are treated as „distortions‟ in terms of the favoured 
Pareto-Optimal model (Bhagwati & Krueger, 2001). However, little attention is 
paid to deteriorating living conditions and incomes and overall aggregate demands 
in the country (Sen, 2005).Theoretically, untested free trade theory is still referred 
and propagated by international institutions and Western countries, pushing for 
reduction in tariffs and opening of the markets in developing countries (Sen, 2005). 
The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model was validated with experiences in 
Europe and North America, where in fact the evidence suggests a commodity-price 
convergence took place. The price gap between exporting and importing countries 
which was substantial in 1870 diminished rapidly up to 1914. This convergence in 
commodity prices extended to North America and Europe and improved the terms 
of trade for all the major European countries and North America. 
It seems useful to briefly discuss development of modern businesses in India, 
especially in the 20
th
 century. Indian businesses are embodiments of pre-industrial 
forms of capital accumulation through money lending and trading. During the two 
World Wars and the Great Depression they had more freedom in the sense of 
setting up industries and had capital accumulation including black marketing and 
swindling in government contracts. British interests were more diverted towards 
railways, engineering, jute and tea plantations (Tyabji, 2015). Levkovsky (1966) 
also argues that development of businesses in India under British rule was very 
different from that in West European countries. Unlike in Western Europe, in 
India, the emergence of industries did not follow a transition from independent 
artisans to manually operated manufacturers to modern power-driven factories. In 
India, manufacturers were closely linked with the merchants‟ and usurers‟ capital. 
For a relatively long period, Levkovsky finds, manufacturers continued to engage 
in money lending and trading along with industrial operations (Levkovsky, 1966; 
Siddiqui, 2015b).  
In fact, the merchant and usury capital and industrial capital are distinct forms 
of capital that employ different methods of accumulation. Merchant capital 
generates profits through buying and selling commodities, usury capital makes 
profits through the interest on loans advanced by money lenders, while industrial 
capital on the other hand makes profits by buying raw materials and employing 
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workers and producing manufactured products and innovations of new products. 
As Dobb examined, in Western European countries, with the expansion of 
industries the importance of industrial capital increased over time, while the 
merchant capital operation declined relatively. The usury role also declined over 
time with the decline of peasant-based agriculture. As Tyabji (2015) observes, “the 
existence of a class of businessmen does not automatically mean the existence of a 
group of industrially oriented entrepreneurs, because the development of industries 
is not necessarily the only money-making activity available to these businessmen… 
In the Indian case, colonialism and „arrested development‟ formed the context 
within which emerged the group of businessmen responsible for managing 
industrial ventures after independence. They were part of an imperfectly formed 
group of industrialists possessing characteristics that reflected their background of 
engagement in non-industrial activities; activities which they continued to be 
involved, even as they acquired control over industrial companies” (Tyabji, 
2015:102). 
Global economic integration without taking into consideration the different 
levels of developing and the specific economic situation of the country would be a 
futile and meaningless attempt at such integration. Sachs & Warner (1995) argue 
that the globalisation process and global market integration, as measured by the 
international flow of goods and services, will promote growth and convergence in 
income levels between developed and developing countries. According to them, 
since the increased integration began in the 1980s, supported by the IMF and 
WTO, Economic integration means “not only increased market based trade and 
financial flows, but also institutional harmonisation with regards to trade policy, 
legal codes, tax systems, ownership patterns and other regulatory arrangements” 
(Sachs & Warner, 1995: 2). 
Ha-Joon Chang (2008) examined the earlier industrial and trade policies of the 
developed countries such as Britain, Germany, France, the US and Japan and found 
that when these countries were in the process of building their industries they used 
protectionist policy measures to develop their „infant industries‟. He says the 
current international rules imposed via the IMF/World Bank and WTO would not 
facilitate the development of an industrial sector in these countries. Chang notes, 
“Neo-liberal globalisation has failed to deliver on all fronts of economic life – 
growth, equality and stability. Despite this we are constantly told how neo-liberal 
globalisation has brought unprecedented benefits” (Chang, 2008: 28). 
It is difficult to explain why, despite higher levels of economic integration 
between countries within the last three decades, the outcomes have been “negative 
externalities” such as a rise in income inequality and persistence of poverty in sub-
Saharan Africa, Latin America and South Asia (Siddiqui, 1998).  
Present globalisation involves further integration of countries into the globalised 
markets, which is supported by fast communication channels and high technology. 
Globalisation could be identified according to the following characteristics: Capital 
has more freedom both in terms of investment opportunities and selling of products 
in global markets; increased integration of national markets with the global market; 
and dominance of finance (Perrotta & Sunna, 2013). However, all these are 
undermining and making it difficult to make and implement sovereign economic 
policies suitable for local conditions.  
The neo-classical theory uncritically accepts the role of the markets and argues 
that if markets are given freedom, then economic growth could be attained with 
efficiency and ultimately will be able to achieve higher output, consumption and 
distribution, which is defined as Pareto Optimum (Krueger, 1996). This theory 
under the pretext of harmony ignores what Karl Polanyi‟s book Great 
Transformation terms “double movement” during the rise of capitalism, i.e. 
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expansion of market relations, with legislation made to protect society from its 
consequences, which is far from self-regulating. In effect, expansion of markets 
proceeded with dispossessions and displacements of people from their inhabitants. 
The current wave of globalisation began in the 1980s in spheres of production 
and finance and is a bit different from the previous one. During this wave of 
globalisation, we find that foreign capital and multinational corporations and 
international portfolios flow are far more important players than in the earlier 
period. This has led to the acceleration of capital investment in the manufacturing 
sectors in the former colonies, which was in the earlier globalisation phase largely 
limited to mining and railways. De-industrialisation via trade and transfer of 
surplus from colonies remains a very crucial element in the analysis of the past 
economic history of the developing countries. Foreign investment is tied to intra-
firm trade and has been increasing at a faster rate than world output, especially 
since the 1980s. For instance, FDI inward stock rose from 7% of world GDP in 
1980 to 30% in 2010. This seems to be due to global companies expecting to 
receive very high profits and establishing strategic control over their supply lines. 
As a result, there has been a massive increase in the export oriented industries, 
especially in the East Asian region including China. Moreover, in 2010, for the first 
time more than 50% of FDI went to developing countries and foreign capital is 
now the biggest source of external funding for these countries (Perrotta & Sunna, 
2013; Siddiqui, 2009). 
During the past quarter century we have witnessed the signing of a number of 
treaties and agreements, whereby international capital imposes further rules and 
regulations on governments, which limits the autonomy of the sovereign countries 
and in turn forces them to ask for assistance from international capital and 
governments of the developed countries; this will ultimately restrict their adoption 
of independent policies and undermine any possibilities of the poor countries 
building autonomous development. 
Unlike GATT, the WTO includes mechanisms for dispute settlement and most 
likely would favour the interests of big corporations that can afford high legal costs 
and lobby to pursue their own interests. Moreover, the TRIPs agreement provides 
multinational corporations greater powers than currently held. Furthermore, 
agricultural trade liberalisation is undermining food security in most developing 
countries and many of them will become food importers. At the same time trade 
liberalisation in the agriculture sector would benefit agricultural exporting 
developed countries that have experience, technology and capital to take advantage 
of the new situation (Reinert, 2007). 
 
6. Conclusion 
The study finds that globalisation and policies of „free trade‟in the past decades 
did not lead to rapid growth and economic convergence in most developing 
countries. The theory of comparative advantage is presented in support for 
worldwide trade liberalisation. The theory claims that free trade is beneficial for all 
countries. It further assumes that free trade will automatically lead to the realisation 
of various other benefits. The contribution of this paper is that a number of 
empirical evidence from the majority of developing countries proves such claims 
are a fallacy. 
Trade and services liberalisation also includes TRIPS, which covers protection 
of trademarks, patents, industrial design and copyrights. At present, as far as the 
question of knowledge and technology is concerned, the developed countries are 
net producers and the developing countries are net consumers. TRIPS will increase 
the price of patentable knowledge to consumers and as a consequence, the flow of 
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rents from the developing countries to developed countries will increase. It appears 
that new regulations such as GATS and TRIMS are designed to benefit the large 
companies of the developed countries to make it easier for them to enter and exit 
markets with fewer restrictions and obligations and to protect their appropriation of 
technological ownership rents. 
The developing countries need to adopt trade and economic policies that are 
more suitable to their stages of development, which they face, will enable them to 
achieve higher rates of growth. The economic development should be put as centre 
stage in WTO negotiations which may require a drastic change in the culture and 
conduct of such negotiations. At present, it appears to be steeped in narrow 
mercantilism rather than any long-term vision of trading system that benefits most 
of the developing countries.  
The study concludes that state intervention in the national economy has proved 
to be a crucial policy element in achieving successful economic development. The 
recent experiences, not only in East Asian countries, but also in developed 
countries since the Second World War, show the role of the state to be important 
for achieving economic development. There seems to be a need, both on theoretical 
and empirical grounds, for state management to make the market friendlier towards 
national economic developmental needs. Therefore, developing countries need to 
change their course of economic strategy away from global financial instability and 
dependence on foreign markets to, instead, relying on domestic investment, wage 
and employment-led growth. 
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